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FIFTH AMENDMENT: COMPULSORY PRODUCTION OF INCRIMINATING
BUSINESS RECORDS
Since the 1886 decision of Boyd v. United States,'
the fifth amendment 2 has been read to accord an
individual the right to limit the compulsory pro-
duction of incriminating private papers. Until re-
cently, this special right to privacy established in
Boyd has been limited only to the extent that it has
not protected against the production of records of
corporations,3 business associations4 and partner-
ships. 5 An individual who holds documents in a
representative capacity for one of these organiza-
tions cannot resist the mandatory production of
these types of records.6 However, a sole proprietor,
so long as his business is not recognizable apart
from himself, has been allowed to use the fifth
amendment to protect himself from having incrim-
inating private business documents subpoenaed.7
Recently, the judicial trend has been to restrict
even the sole proprietor's fifth amendment rights.
The Supreme Court, in Fisher v. United States8 and
Andresen v. Maiyland,9 strictly interpreting the fifth
amendment, held that the privilege against self-
incrimination did not prevent disclosure of docu-
ments prepared by an accountant i or documents
seized in a warrant-supported search." In these
cases the Court ignored privacy considerations and
relied solely on the fact that the businesses' records
were obtained without literally compelling an in-
dividual to testify against himself. In In re Grand
Jury Empanelled12 the Third Circuit held that the
government could acquire business records indi-
rectly from the employees of a sole proprietor
without infringing the sole proprietor's right
against self-incrimination. In both Fisher and Grand
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
2The fifth amendment, in pertinent part, provides:
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
3See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
4 See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
5 See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
68Seeid. at 101.7 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 483 F.2d 961, 962
(3d Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Bellis v. United States, 417
U.S. 85 (1974).
8425 U.S. 391 (1976).
9 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
10 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
"Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
12597 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1979).
Jury Empanelled the courts refused to adopt the
argument that the fifth amendment should apply
since the individual whose records were in question
was in constructive possession of the documents
even though they were in the hands of others.
1 3
I
The fifth amendment states that no person "shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." In Boyd v. United States14 the
amendment was found to apply to protect against
the compulsory production of incriminating pri-
vate papers. The Supreme Court viewed the fifth
amendment as protecting "the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life."'" Since the Boyd
decision, the fifth amendment protection afforded
business records has been continually restricted.
The Supreme Court has held that the fifth amend-
ment right of an individual will not preclude the
compulsory production of the books of a corpora-
tion'6 or of an unincorporated association.' 7 In
Bellis v. United States'8 the Court stretched this
corporate exception to fifth amendment protection
to cases where the organization has "'a recogniz-
able juridical existence apart from its members."'
9
In Bellis one of three lawyers who were partners
was found to be holding the partnership records in
a representative capacity and thus could not assert
his fifth amendment right to protect against disclo-
20
sure of the partnership's documents.
Recently, in Fisher v. United States,21 the Supreme
Court abandoned its consideration of invasion of
privacy in business record cases22 and adopted a
more objective analysis."3 The Court decided that
'3 See 425 U.S. at 398; 597 F.2d at 862.
14 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
15 Id. at 630.
16 See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
17See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
Is417 U.S. 85 (1974).19 Id. at 87 (quoting the lower court opinion, 483 F.2d
at 962).
20417 U.S. at 101.
2' 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
2 As recently as 1973 in Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322 (1973), the Court spoke of a "legitimate expec-
tation of privacy" which an individual is accorded by the
fifth amendment. Id. at 336.
"425 U.S. at 400.
the only factor subject to consideration is whether
an individual "is compelled to make a testimonial
communication that is incriminating."
'
In Fisher the Internal Revenue Service was con-
ducting an investigation of a taxpayer for possible
criminal liability under the federal tax laws. The
taxpayer had obtained copies of his accountant's
workpapers that had been used in the preparation
of tax returns and turned them over to his attorneys
to aid them in the preparation of his defense. The
IRS served a summons upon the lawyers for the
production of these documents. The Supreme
Court found that the fifth amendment did not
protect the documents from disclosure because the
taxpayer himself was not compelled to do any-
thing. It was the attorneys who were producing the
documents while "the taxpayer [was] the accused
and nothing [was] being extorted from him."2 5
Additionally, it was the accountants who had pre-
pared the statements, so the taxpayer was not
compelled to communicate anything. 6
The Fisher decision further held that the fact
that the attorney may have been the agent of the
taxpayer made no difference. The Court relied on
Couch v. United States2 7 where it held that the fifth
amendment did not protect against production of
business records when they were subpoenaed from
the individual's accountant. 2s Similarly, the Court
refused to recognize fifth amendment protection in
Fisher based upon a claim of attorney-client privi-
lege. The Court held that the attorney-client priv-
ilege would only apply where the records that were
in the hands of the attorney would be protected if
they were in the hands of the client.29 The Court
found that the attorney-client privilege would not
apply in Fisher since the documents in question,
accountant's workpapers prepared from an analysis
of the taxpayer's business records, would not be
protected if the taxpayer himself was in possession
of them. The Court stated:
A subpoena served on a taxpayer requiring him to
produce an accountant's workpapers in his posses-
24 Id. at 408 (emphasis in original). The Fisher Court
left open the question of whether truly "private papers"
would be protected, id. at 414, and mentioned that it
"has never suggested that every invasion of privacy vio-
lates the privilege," id. at 399. This language implies that
perhaps a privacy argument would be relevant under
certain circumstances, namely, where business records
are not involved.
25 Id. at 398.
26 Id. at 409.
27 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
28 Id. at 329.
29 425 U.S. at 402-03.
sion without doubt involves substantial compulsion.
But it does not compel oral testimony; nor would it
ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or
affirm the truth of the contents of the documents
sought. Therefore the Fifth Amendment would not
be violated by the fact alone that the papers on their
face might incriminate the taxpayer, for the privilege
protects a person only against being incriminated by
his own compelled testimonial communications....
The accountant's workpapers are not the taxpayer's.
They were not prepared by the taxpayer, and con-
tain no testimonial declarations by him.
30
In a case decided the same term as Fisher, the
Supreme Court further eroded the privacy protec-
tion available in business-records-disclosure situa-
tions. In Andresen v. Maryland31 the accused objected
to the introduction into evidence of business rec-
ords which were obtained by the government dur-
ing a legal search of the business premises. The
Court held that although "the records seized from
petitioner's offices and introduced against him
were incriminating ... [and] that some of these
business records contained statements made by
petitioner,"32 he was not compelled to testify as to
any matter.
The literal reading of the fifth amendment ap-
plied in the Fisher and Andresen cases may at first
seem shocking. Historically, the fifth amendment
was read to allow an individual a privacy interest
in his personal business papers." Now the Court
has interpreted the fifth amendment to allow the
government to obtain indirectly the information
that it cannot obtain directly from the individual,
if the information leaves the individual's possession
or is seized pursuant to a search warrant. When
viewed in light of the Court's previous decisions
denying protection to corporate-type records, the
decision does not seem so harsh. The Court has
balanced the benefits and harms of protecting
business records and has decided against their pro-
tection.r Weighing heavily in support of the
Court's decision is the fact that doing business is a
decision to be in the public domain. Thus, the
Supreme Court has now removed completely much
of the constitutional protection for business records.
II
The Third Circuit in In re GrandJury Empanelled
35
further restricted the fifth amendment right of a
30 Id. at 409 (citations omitted).
"' 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
32 Id. at 471.
"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 630.
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 400.
"597 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1979).
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sole proprietor by allowing a subpoena requiring
an employee to produce the business records to be
enforced upon an employee. By not recognizing
the sole proprietor's fifth amendment right as con-
structive possessor of the documents, the decision
limits the operation of the right against self-incrim-
ination to circumstances where the sole proprietor
himself prepares and maintains the records, a cir-
cumstance unlikely to be found in any but the
smallest business.
In the GrandJuty Empanelled case a sole proprietor
who ran an excavating and trucking business was
under criminal investigation. The business had
been in existence for twenty years and had devel-
oped into a large organization with many employ-
ees. The office manager was in charge of preparing
and maintaining records of billings and corre-
spondence with clients. The sole proprietor himself
may or may not have made entries into the rec-
ords.36 The government served subpoenas on both
the proprietor and his employee for the production
of the business records. The sole proprietor asserted
that his fifth amendment right against self-incrim-
ination prohibited compulsory disclosure of the
documents by either himself or his employee. In
reversing the district court, which had quashed the
subpoena, the Third Circuit found that the fifth
amendment right of the sole proprietor did not
protect the records from disclosure by process upon
his employee.
The government first contended that the fifth
amendment was not applicable because the sole
proprietorship had "by virtue of its longevity and
size, taken on the character of an 'organized insti-
tutional activity.' ' 37 The court in GrandJuiy Em-
panelled found that the sole proprietorship in ques-
tion did not fit within that category but rather was
"wholly owned by and [had] no existence at law
apart from [the proprietor] ' ' 8 and that "such rec-
ords may be protected from disclosure by the Fifth
Amendment.,
39
The Grand Jugy Empanelled court realized that
"unless the employment relationship between the
person subpoenaed.., and the person asserting the
privilege ... presents circumstances not involved
in Fisher,"40 it would be bound under that decision
to find for the government since the sole proprietor
36 See text accompanying note 53 infra.
37 597 F.2d at 859 (quoting Bellis v. United States, 417
U.S. at 92).
3 597 F.2d at 859.
9 Id. (emphasis in original).4Id at 861.
was not compelled to produce the documents him-
self. The sole proprietor tried to distinguish his case
from Fisher by claiming that he was in "construc-
tive possession" of his documents. This argument
had been used successfully in several cases41 and
was alluded to by the Supreme Court in Couch v.
United States.
42
In Couch, the taxpayer, who was a sole proprie-
tress of a restaurant, had annually given her ac-
countant the business records so that he could
prepare income tax returns. The Court recognized
that the doctrine of constructive possession may
apply in certain situations43 but that it was not
applicable in Couch because "the accountant him-
self worked neither in petitioner's office nor as her
employee."' The Court noted further that it had
been the practice of the Internal Revenue Service
not to issue summons upon full-time employees
who were in possession of the records upon the
premises of the business.
45
The GrandJury Empanelled court was faced with
a situation, unlike that in Couch, where the sub-
poena was served in the proprietor's office upon
one of his employees. The court responded to the
Couch Court's reasoning by stating: "While we
might find [the sole proprietor's] constructive pos-
session argument of more interest if Couch was the
Supreme Court's definitive decision regarding this
concept, we observe that the discussion in Couch
was dictum, and the Supreme Court formulated
no standard for bringing constructive possession
within the Fifth Amendment privilege. ' A6 The
court responded with similar disregard to the de-
cisions of other circuits which have recognized the
doctrine of constructive possession.4'
In United States v. Guterma"8 the Second Circuit
applied the constructive possession theory when an
individual who kept his files in the safe of a cor-
poration asserted his fifth amendment right as a
shield against the subpoena served upon the cor-
poration. The GrandJuy Empanelled court distin-
guished the two cases by noting the fact that in
Guterma it was the individual's personal records
that were concerned as opposed to the business
41 See text accompanying notes 47-50 infra.
42 409 U.S. 322, 333-35 (1973).
4 Id. at 333.
44Id. at 334.
45Id. at 334 n.18.
46 597 F.2d at 862.
47 The GrandJuwy Empanelled court found it significant
that the Supreme Court in Couch did not expressly ap-
prove constructive possession claims upheld in previous
circuit court decisions. Id. at 862 n.31.
48 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959).
records in GrandJuy Empanelled4 9 The Fisher Court
specifically left open the question of whether the
result in that case would be different if an individ-
ual's private papers were involved. 5°
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Osborn,
5
1
held that business documents such as "corporate
financial statements, an agreement for sale, tele-
phone records, billing records, and a few business
letters-are business documents analagous to the
accountant's workpapers in Fisher"52 and would
not be protected by the fifth amendment even if
they were in the hands of the sole proprietor.
The business records involved in the Grand Jury
Empanelled case were job folders containing all cor-
respondence and billings involved with the busi-
ness. It was clear that an employee prepared and
maintained these records, but the facts also stipu-
late that the sole proprietor himself may have made
entries.ss Upon final analysis, however, the court
interpreted the facts as though the sole proprietor
made no entries into the records.5
The practical effect of the GrandJury Empanelled
decision is to extend the Bellis55 holding, even
though the court found Bellis not applicable to the
Grand Jury Empanelled case.56 Bellis held that the
fifth amendment would not apply to protect dis-
closure of records if the business had a separate
existence apart from its owners. GrandJury Empa-
nelled serves to extend this doctrine to all but the
most private organization. The decision has this
effect because its holding allows the government to
obtain business records of a sole proprietorship
from the employees of the business who are in
possession of such records. In all but the smallest
business the proprietor must, by necessity, delegate
various duties to his employees including the han-
dling of business documents.
CONCLUSION
The judicial trend has been to decrease fifth
amendment rights in the area of business records,
and the courts are well on their way to extinguish-
ing shields against the production of business rec-
ords altogether, whether prepared and maintained
by the proprietor or not. As long as the records are
4 597 F.2d at 862.
0425 U.S. at 414.
5' 561 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977).5
2Id. at 1338.
"597 F.2d at 861.
sId. at 861 n.24.
5 See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
5597 F.2d at 861.
seized pursuant to a valid search, the Andresen
decision indicates that any business records will be
admissable into evidence.
The objective fifth amendment analysis used by
the courts in the business records cases may not be
logical when applied to a constructive possession
argument of a sole proprietor. Certainly, all records
made and kept by an employee are made under
the direction and control of the sole proprietor.
Additionally, "a sole proprietorship has no legal
existence apart from its owner." 57 That being so, it
seems rather anomalous to say that a subpoena
served upon an employee of a sole proprietorship
for production of company records does not compel
disclosure from the proprietor. The proprietor is
legally responsible for the actions of the business,
and he is in control of the business records when
they remain on the business premises.
It remains to be seen whether the constructive
possession theory will be similarly discarded in a
case where the proprietor himself prepared and
maintained the records and only temporarily relin-
quished possession to an employee. However, the
issue will be moot if the courts continue the trend
and remove fifth amendment protection from busi-
ness records altogether.
Six years ago, Justice Douglas, in his dissenting
opinion in Couch, was fearful about the ever-dimin-
ishing fifth amendment right in the business realm.
Justice Douglas feared that the future would bring
ingenious methods of obtaining private informa-
tion including compelling trusted employees to
disclose information.ss In light of the Andresen,
Fisher and Grand Jury Empanelled decisions, it ap-
pears that the worst of Justice Douglas' fears have
7 d. at 859.
s8justice Douglas wrote:
The majority, by the seeming implications of its
opinion, has cleared the way for investigatory au-
thorities to compel disclosure of facets of our life we
heretofore considered sacrosanct. We are told that
"situations may well arise where ... the relinquish-
ment of possession is so temporary and insignificant
as to leave the personal compulsions upon the ac-
cused substantially intact." I can see no basis in the
majority opinion, however, for stopping short of
condemning only those intrusions resting on com-
pulsory process against the author of the thoughts
or documents. Are we now to encourage meddling
by the Government and even more ingenious meth-
ods of obtaining access to sought-after materials?
The premium now will be on subterfuge, on by-
passing the master of the domain by spiriting the
materials away or compelling disclosure by a trusted
employee or confidant.
409 U.S. 341-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at
333 (majority opinion)) (footnote omitted).
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come true. He believed that
[ilnevitably, this would lead those of us who cherish
our privacy to refrain from recording our thoughts
or trusting anyone with even temporary custody of
documents we want to protect from public disclo-
sure. In short, it will stultify the exchange of ideas
that we have considered crucial to our democracy.
59
The court in GrandJuwy Empanelled had an op-
portunity to counter the judicial trend limiting the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion with regard to the compelled production of
business records. Instead, by not recognizing the
59 1d. at 342.
doctrine of constructive possession in favor of a sole
proprietor of business records in the hands of an
employee on the premises, the court gave every
indication that the trend will continue. The courts
may not be ready to apply the literal reading of
the fifth amendment to purely personal records of
an individual, 6° but given the rapid restriction of
the fifth amendment right, it is not an altogether
unlikely prospect. A person who truly cherishes his
privacy may be safe only if he keeps written doc-
uments solely within his own possession and under
lock and key.
6 See Fisher v. United States. 425 U.S. at 414.
